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In modern growth literature institutions and regula-
tions are considered fundamental causes for eco-
nomic development shaping the incentives of
investors and entrepreneurs to engage in business
activities.1 Moreover,the wealth of a nation has been
recognized as being associated with its quality of reg-
ulation, whereas regulatory regimes are not indige-
nous and depend to a great extent on the colonial
heritage in certain parts of the world, particularly in
poor an developing countries. To investigate how
regulations enhance and constrain business activities
around the world, the World Bank in cooperation
with the International Finance Corporation launch-
ed an annual series of Doing Business reports,which
started back in 2004.These reports present quantita-
tive indicators on business regulations and the pro-
tection of property rights that help to expand our
understanding of regulations in an international con-
text across more than 180 countries and to assess the
repercussions of regulatory reforms in countries with
high regulatory burdens.
To analyze the effects of regulation on business
activity the Doing Business reports collect data on
several distinct features of a country’s business envi-
ronment. In the Doing Business 2004 report the
World Bank began with five business related indica-
tors, namely, starting a business, hiring and firing
workers,enforcing a contract,getting credit and clos-
ing a business.In the most recent report versions the
indicators have been increased from five to ten to
dealing with construction permits, registering prop-
erty, protecting investors, paying taxes and trading
across boarders. Ultimately, out of these indicators a
general Ease of Doing Business indicator has been
constructed that enables a ranking of countries by
business regulations from most to least efficient.
A fundamental finding of the reports is that poor
countries regulate businesses the most.While it takes
several months for the top performers in industrial-
ized countries to go through bankruptcy proceed-
ings, in developing countries it is several years. In
most cases heavier regulation is associated with
higher inefficiencies in public institutions that gener-
ate low productivity and high costs. Furthermore,
heavier regulation encourages informal business
activities, e.g., in Bolivia, where 82 percent of busi-
ness activities is located in the informal sector.2
Poorer countries also tend to grant fewer property
rights to their citizens. In industrialized countries
creditors, for example, have considerable power to
recover their money in case of a debtor’s default,
whereas developing countries often do not provide
such rights.
Since the measurement of institutional regulations
and quality is a non-trivial undertaking, the follow-
ing research report intends to provide an overview
of the applied methodology of measuring regula-
tions and seeks to give an extended evaluation of the
methodological assumptions underlying two select-
ed Doing Business indicators. Those two indicators
are Starting a Business and Closing a Business.Since
the World Bank’s overall Ease of Doing Business
indicator comprises a range of several sub-indicators
the two selected indicators covered in this report are
chosen with respect to consistencies in their method-
ological setup, but also as entry and exit regulations
are considered typical determinants of market struc-
ture, competition and growth in the economic
growth literature.
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Methodology of business regulation indicators
The World Bank’s methodology of constructing busi-
ness regulation indicators in general, and the two en-
try (Starting a Business) and exit (Closing a Business)
indicators in particular,rely on unique data collection
via standardized surveys. Those surveys are designed
by academic experts and employ a simple hypotheti-
cal business case which defines characteristic features
of the studied business with respect to its legal form,
size,location and nature of operations.By introducing
a standardized business case the World Bank seeks to
ensure comparability of country-specific regulatory
effects on business activities across a wide range of
countries as well as over time. Eventually, the survey
is sent to more than 8,000 local experts, including, for
example, lawyers, business consultants and govern-
ment officials. In particular, about 1,400 and 860 pro-
fessionals contributed to the entry and exit case study,
respectively.3Taking the 2010 country coverage of 183
countries there is on average about 8 professionals for
the entry and 5 professionals for the exit case study.
The aim of the entry and exit indicators is to measure
the effects of government regulation on the business
environment, and on entrepreneurs’ and investors’
decisions to take on the risk and costs of starting a busi-
ness.Beyond the pure measurement of regulations,the
collected data are also intended to assess the contribu-
tion of regulatory reforms to improve the business
environment of countries ranked as having low quality
and the least efficient business regulations.In doing so,
the measurement of business indicators relies primari-
ly on the determination of regulatory outcomes mea-
sured in terms of procedures to register a business or
the time and costs required to go through bankruptcy,
for example. At the same time, the indicators do not
capture the effect of a country-specific law or rule, but
the aggregate result after specific laws and rules within
a country have been applied to the case studies.Due to
various different aspects of country-specific regula-
tions a set of entry and exit outcome indictors has been
introduced to ensure wider coverage of potential
impacts associated with business regulations.
Starting a Business indicator
According to Doing Business (2004), the case study
assumptions for both entry and exit indicators define
the object of investigation as a limited liability com-
pany. Selecting this specific kind of legal business
form was done to ensure world-wide comparability of
business forms as far as possible.Furthermore,in both
case studies the company is assumed to be located in
the country’s most populous city and to be 100 per-
cent domestically owned. Specifically, in the entry
case the company is defined as having five owners, of
whom none is a legal entity. The company’s paid-in-
cash start-up capital is ten times a country’s income
per capita and for the nature of operations the com-
pany is characterized as performing general industri-
al or commercial activities. Regarding the company
size, it is assumed that one month after operations
have started, the company will have at least 10–50
employees.The company’s expected turnover is set to
be at least 100 times income per capita.4
Methodology of the business entry indicator
Based on the previous assumptions, four outcome
indicators are derived from the surveys that try to
proxy for the main obstacles new firms are faced
with when registering a business.The measured out-
comes associated with business entry regulation are:
number of procedures, time and cost to register, and
minimum capital requirements (Djankov et al.
2002). The following explanations enlarge upon the
single indicators:5
• Number of procedures: procedures are defined as
the authorities or external parties an entrepre-
neur needs to encounter before he can start a
business. Besides negative effects stemming from
delaying market entry,encountering many official
authorities before opening a business can also be
compared to a “tollbooth” that stops the entre-
preneur and collects money (Djankov et al.2002).
Both effects prolong the registration procedure
and increase direct and indirect entry costs.
• Time: this indicator captures the median duration
necessary to complete a registration procedure. It
is assumed that the minimum time required for
each procedure is one day. The time indicator
accounts for actual registration as well as all pre-
and post-registrations, whereas the entire regis-
tration procedure is assumed to be completed
when all the final documents are received.
• Cost: the cost component of the registration
process is measured as a percentage of the coun-
try’s income per capita and includes all official
3 The number of local experts changes over time and refers to the
latest version of the Doing Business report;see data notes in Doing
Business (2010), 77.
4 For more details on the assumptions of the business case for the
Starting a Business indicator, see Doing Business (2004), 106.
5 For more details on the indicators,see Doing Business (2004),107fees as well as fees for legal or professional ser-
vices, excluding bribes. If information on fee
schedules is not available, estimates from govern-
ment officers or incorporation lawyers are used
alternatively.
• Minimum capital requirement: similar to cost the
paid-in minimum capital requirement is mea-
sured as percentage of the country’s income per
capita. It reflects the amount of starting capital
the entrepreneur needs to put into a bank
account or with a notary before the actual regis-
tration procedure begins.The account is assumed
to be frozen during business entry and remains so
until the dissolution of the company.6
Corresponding to the reform recommendations in
Doing Business (2004) only two registration proce-
dures would be sufficient: notification of existence
(for statistical purposes) and tax and social security
registration (Doing Business 2004, 17). A reduction
in procedures is motivated by the fact that burden-
some entry regulations are associated with a reduc-
tion in private investments, administrative corrup-
tion and,in general,with a flourishing informal econ-
omy.7 The idea of reducing registration procedures
draws on Djankov et al. (2002), who analyzed com-
peting approaches to public interest and public
choice theory.While according to the theory of pub-
lic interest, stricter entry regulations are connected
with higher consumer welfare, public choice theory
emphasizes that regulations primarily generate rents
for bureaucrats and incumbent firms.As the empiri-
cal evidence mainly supports the public choice
approach,according to which numerous entry proce-
dures and rent extraction by politicians resemble a
“tollbooth”with entrepreneurs having to pay a “fee”
at each stage of the registration process (see
McChesney 1987; Shleifer and Vishny 1993), reduc-
ing cumbersome registration burdens is associated
with higher economic outcomes.
Another reputed pro-entry regulations argument
based on the association that unregulated markets
usually exhibit frequent market failures ranging
from monopoly power to externalities (Stiglitz
1989),is declined by the World Bank’s report.8 Seek-
ing to address market failures a benevolent govern-
ment tries to increase economic and social outcomes
by introduction of regulations that intend to prohib-
it market failures. However, empirical evidence
based on World Bank studies shows that this is not
the case. For example, enforcement of international
quality standards actually decreases with an increase
in the number of entry procedures,and investors are
more reluctant to invest in such countries that are
characterized by high entry regulations.9
Business entry regulation across countries
In their recent Ease of Doing Business index release
(Doing Business 2010) the World Bank ranks coun-
tries from 1 to 183 in terms of best regulations and
property rights protection.Therefore each country’s
aggregate Ease of Doing Business index rank is cal-
culated from the average of each of its sub-indexes
(as Starting a Business, Closing a Business, etc.) per-
centile rankings. The ranking of each sub-index is, in
turn,derived from the average of the percentile rank-
ings of its sub-components. For the index Starting a
Business the country rank is calculated from the aver-
age of the percentile rankings of the four sub-compo-
nents time, cost, number of procedures and mini-
mum capital requirements.10 For the calculation of
the Starting a Business index rank it is assumed that
reductions in the numerical values of all sub-compo-
nents are associated with better regulations; hence,
the lower the value of each sub-component the high-
er its percentile ranks and thus the higher the aver-
age percentile rank of a country on the Starting a
Business index ranking.
Table 1 shows the most recent country ranking for
the Starting a Business indicator from the Doing
Business 2010 report (Doing Business 2010). The
ranking shows that the top 10 group of countries that
regulate business entry the least is dominated by
high- and upper-middle income countries,particular-
ly, by Anglo-Saxon countries like New Zealand,
Canada,Australia and the United States.Upper-mid-
dle income countries with the highest ease in busi-
ness entry regulations in 2010 are Belarus and
Macedonia.The bottom 10 group mainly consists of
poor and lower-middle income countries located pri-
marily in Sub-Saharan Africa.Compared to previous
country ranking releases most of these countries
remained in the bottom 10 group.
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7 Doing Business (2004), 18.
8 Doing Business (2004), 21 f.
9 Doing Business (2004), 22.
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The country rankings provide initial evidence that
rich countries tend to have better business entry reg-
ulations than poor countries. A detailed look at the
sub-components of the Starting a Business index
offers further insight into which entry outcomes mat-
ter and underlines the relationship between less
entry regulation and a country’s income endowment.
According to Figure 1a there is a negative, but less
distinct relationship between the time required for
registering a business and income. While there is a
generally downward sloping trend from poor to rich
countries, upper-middle-income countries also exhi-
bit a high average registration time. However, the
time required for registering is lowest in high-in-
come countries (about 20 days). Upper-middle-in-
come countries exhibit a registration time of almost
47 days on average11, whereas in lower-middle-in-
come and poor countries the average registration
time is around 35 and 45 days, respectively.
Regarding the cost sub-component (Figure 1a) there
is a much more marked negative relationship be-
tween a country’s income and the cost required to
register a business. While high-income countries
exhibit the lowest costs (< 7 percent of income per
capita), upper-middle- and lower-middle-income
countries’ registration costs lie between 16 and 43
percent of income per capita. Low-income countries
show the highest registration cost with more than 107
percent on average.
The sub-component of procedures in Figure 1b again
reveals a negative relationship between income
endowment and the number of registration proce-
dures, although it is less pronounced than for costs.
While throughout low-, lower-middle-, and upper-
middle-income countries there is only a slight de-
crease in number of registration procedures, ranging
from 8 to 9 on average,the number of procedures for
high-income countries drops significantly to below 7.
On the contrary, for the last sub-component of the
entry indicator a clearly negative relationship be-
tween a country’s income endowment and the mini-
mum capital requirement becomes apparent (Figure
1b). While rich and upper-middle-income countries
require a capital deposit between 0 and 20 percent on
average of income per capita, low-
er-middle-income countries com-
plete the registration process after
entrepreneurs have put in an aver-
age of 60 percent of income per
capita before starting a business.
For low-income countries the capi-
tal requirement reaches an aston-
ishing 153 percent on average of
income per capita.
High registration costs and mini-
mum capital requirements, espe-
cially in poor countries are most
Table 1 
Starting a Business (ranking 2010) 
Top 10 Group Rank 





Macedonia, FYR 6 
Belarus 7
United States 8 
Ireland 9
Mauritius 10 
Bottom 10 Group Rank 
Cameroon 174 
Iraq 175 
West Bank and Gaza  176 
Djibouti 177 






  Sources: Doing Business Database (2010). The data
















Source: Doing Business Database (2010).
TIME AND COST 
Starting a Business 2010
Days Cost  in % of income per capita
Time
Cost
Notes: Lines shown represent the average indicator values by income group.
 income  income
Figure 1a
11 The high registration time in upper-mid-
dle-income countries is due to Suriname
with 694 days. Exclusion of this country
results in an average registration time of
about 31 days.likely to put an enormous burden on potential entre-
preneurs and thus drive people into the informal
economy. Despite some less distinct relationships
between single entry regulation outcomes and a coun-
try’s income endowment, the Starting a Business sub-
components support the general view that poorer
countries tend to regulate business entries more than
richer countries. Interestingly, as countries start to
tighten business entry the single outcome indicators
jointly increase, as they are highly correlated with
each other (Doing Business 2004, 22).
Limits of the standard approach in measuring busi-
ness entry regulations
This section evaluates the World Bank’s methodolo-
gy to measure entry regulation and regulation effi-
ciency by referring to the assessment of the World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG 2008)
review. It discusses some of the main caveats under-
lying the standard approach that are specific to the
Starting a Business indicator while a discussion of
general limitations applying to both entry and exit
indicators will be provided later on.
To start with, one drawback in the entry regulation
outcome indicator is the time component that solely
captures the duration necessary to complete the reg-
istration process (Doing Business 2004,107),but nei-
ther takes into account the time of gathering infor-
mation an entrepreneur is faced with before entering
the registration process nor does it consider the
entrepreneur’s effort to collect information during
the registration process. Utilizing the registration
system is assumed to take place with ease and with-
out wasting time. But according
to the firm-level evidence provid-
ed by Hellman and Schankerman
(2000), such a “time tax” plays an
important role.12 These time taxes
usually arise from applying and
interpreting laws and regulations,
which is often connected with
heavy state regulation.
Moreover, the approach of rank-
ing countries according to their
numerical outcome values, and
thereby assuming that better reg-
ulations always go along with low-
er outcome values is not unprob-
lematic. Although reducing bur-
densome regulations at a level of
intolerable bureaucracy may without doubt enhance
a country’s business environment, the logic of lower
minimum capital requirements and better economic
outcomes in particular is not straightforward.
Especially with regard to industrialized countries the
demand for lower minimum capital requirements to
increase firm entry and to foster economic growth in
the long run has proven to be wrong in the wake of
the financial crisis, especially in the banking sector.
The aftermaths of deregulation in this specific sector
have spilled over to the entire economy causing seri-
ous contractions to the overall business environ-
ment. Higher equity capital and lower leverage
would have, in contrast, provided the necessary sta-
bilizing measures for economic growth.
Another critique of the Starting a Business indica-
tor’s ability to assess a country’s economic entry en-
vironment addresses the impact of entry regulations
on new firm entry in principle. This critique goes
beyond regulations, since the numbers of sub-com-
ponents used in the Starting a Business context only
capture a part of the overall costs relevant for firm
entry and thus do not account for other potential
factors. Regarding the cost sub-component De Sa
(2005) and Klapper et al. (2007) argue, for example,
that a decrease in entry costs will not automatically
lead to new firm creation. Rather it is the overall
costs that entering firms face as well as the entire
investment climate that impact whether entrepre-
neurs will start a new business.13 The regulation focus
in the World Bank’s approach thus may be appropri-

























Source: Doing Business Database (2010).
MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT AND PROCEDURES 
Starting a Business 2010
Number of procedures Minimum capital  in % of income per capita
Procedures
Minimum capital
 income  income
Notes: Lines shown represent the average indicator values by income group.
Figure 1b
12 IEG (2008), 27.
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ate for detecting some relevant correlations between
regulation and firm entry, but it is missing other fun-
damental factors of new firm entry.
Furthermore, according to the World Bank’s recom-
mendations to improve efficiency of entry regula-
tions and make registering less burdensome, proce-
dures should be limited to only two: notification of
existence, and tax and social security registration
(Doing Business 2004, 17). The fundamental idea
behind this recommendation is once again that lower
regulation is better in general, which may not be
appropriate for every country. Countries far away
from the world technology frontier may even benefit
from more regulations, as they may function as pos-
sible stabilizing devices. Also, in addition to these
two suggested measures, the World Bank reports
that “other procedures, such as registering with the
statistical office,obtaining environmental permits,or
registering workers for health benefits […] seem to
be socially desirable” (Doing Business 2004, 21).
Following the World Bank’s advice and constructing
the Starting a Business indicator based on the two
suggested procedures only, decreases the number of
relevant entry factors further and, moreover, assigns
the highest rankings to those countries with the best
results in the two procedures. Hence, countries that
excel in other measures that are socially desirable,
but are not accounted for in the overall index, might
be ranked significantly lower than they should be.14 
Closing a Business indicator
When it comes to closing a business, the current
global financial crisis provides a striking example of
the necessity for appropriate institutions able to
cope with bankrupt companies. Financial crises tend
to trigger reform efforts as governments see existing
regulations being tested under difficult economic sit-
uations. As stated by the World Bank in their most
recent report, some countries have reacted quickly
to the crisis (Doing Business 2010, 61). In Germany,
for example, companies which have become insol-
vent during the present crisis but are potentially
viable do not have to file for bankruptcy immediate-
ly. They can continue their operations for the dura-
tion of the crisis. However, this regulation change
will expire at the end of 2010 and was thus meant to
provide only immediate relief for the current eco-
nomic downturn.
The importance of efficient bankruptcy regulations
in general, but particularly during times of severe
economic contractions, becomes especially obvious
when keeping potentially viable but insolvent firms
as going concerns and saving jobs is of the essence,
or when a fast dissolution and new reallocation of
input factors is necessary.By analyzing survey-based
outcome indicators on bankruptcy procedures and
constructing an overall Closing a Business ranking
across countries, the World Bank has attempted to
locate efficient bankruptcy regulations around the
world and to provide appropriate reform recom-
mendations to countries characterized by inefficient
bankruptcy systems.
The business case assumptions for the exit indicator
resemble those for the entry indicators with respect
to legal business form, location and ownership,
except that the business now faces bankruptcy pro-
ceedings instead of an entry registration process. In
addition it is assumed that the chairman of the
supervisory board of the insolvent firm is the firm’s
founder who owns 51 percent of shares, while other
shareholders hold less than 5 percent.The company
is assumed to be a hotel business valued at 100 times
per capita income,15 employs 201 workers and oper-
ates business relationships with 50 suppliers. It also
has a bank loan from a domestic bank and a mort-
gage equal in value to the market value of the
hotel.16
Methodology of the business exit indicator
According to the World Bank, three central indica-
tors assess the efficiency of bankruptcy regulation
across countries (Doing Business 2004). Those indi-
cators are time, cost and recovery rate, from which
only the latter is employed to derive the World
Bank’s country ranking for Closing a Business. The
following describes the single indicators in more
detail and is based on the methodology of Djankov
et al. (2008):17
• Time:the time indicator collects the judgement of
local experts on the time required to recover
creditors’ debt measured in years. Possible delay-
ing tactics as well as appeals and requests for
extensions are included.
14 IEG (2008), 27 f.
15 The minimum value is set at US-$200,000 and is chosen accord-
ing to whichever number is larger.
16 For more details on the assumptions of the business case for the
exit indicator, see Doing Business (2004), 112.
17 For more details on the three indicators,see also Doing Business
(2004), 113 f.• Cost:the costs incurred during
bankruptcy proceedings are
recorded as a percentage of
the business estate’s value and
are derived from the survey
responses of insolvency prac-
titioners. These costs include
court fees as well as fees for all
other contributors encounter-
ed during the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.
• Recovery rate:this rate is mea-
sured in terms of cents on the
dollar recouped by creditors
as a result of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. The measurement
takes into account whether
the business emerges from the
bankruptcy proceedings as a
going concern as well as costs and losses in the
estate’s value incurred during the shut down. In
case of continuation the recovery rate is 100 cents
on the dollar. If the company does not continue
operations the initial 100 cents are reduced to 70
cents on the dollar, and the official costs of the
bankruptcy procedure are deducted additionally.
Ultimately, all other value lost – due to the time
the money is tied up during the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings as well as deprecation – is accounted
for.18 The recovery rate reflects the present value
of the remaining proceeds, based on financial sta-
tistics on lending rates at the end of 2007 provid-
ed by the International Monetary Fund.19
There are several aspects of why formal bankruptcy
proceedings are important (Doing Business 2004,
72–7). One aspect mentioned in the World Bank’s
report is to maximize investors’ value. If bankruptcy
is an expensive, long-lasting undertaking, investors
are likely to avoid it and the distressed company will
possibly lose further resources necessary for its res-
cue.Also, suppliers and customers will try to discon-
tinue business transactions with the insolvent busi-
ness.Finally if the bankruptcy process takes too long,
it will diminish prospects for a healthy recovery of
the business. Figure 2 illustrates the associated posi-
tive relationship between costs and time of resolving
bankruptcy.
Another argument for the introduction of formal
bankruptcy proceedings is that rescuing a viable bu-
siness as premature liquidation of companies in tem-
porary distress may generate loss of value to the so-
ciety and undesired worker layoffs.In general,bank-
ruptcy procedures can end up with three outcomes:
going concern, foreclosure and liquidation. A going
concern is similar to a reorganization of the business,
where the company is protected by court while
attempting to rehabilitate itself.Foreclosure is a debt
enforcement procedure aimed at recovering money
owed to secured creditors, which can be entirely
processed out-of-court. In case of liquidation a com-
pany is dissolved under court supervision leading
most of the time to a sale of the company as a going
concern.20 The exit indicators account for these
potential bankruptcy outcomes.
A third argument in favour of formal bankruptcy
regulations is to keep the order of claims stable.This
is essential as senior creditors will be reluctant to
provide loans if they do not have a predictable pri-
ority to their claims after a company has gone bank-
rupt. This may possibly prompt senior creditors to
block a company’s entry into the bankruptcy proce-
dure. Furthermore, unsettled claim priorities may
encourage certain groups of creditors to force man-
agement either to prevent or to precipitate bank-
ruptcy and thus promote wasting valuable resources.
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18 The recovery rate for countries reporting “no practise” is
assigned zero. For a detailed description of the calculations of the
recovery rate, see Djankov et al. (2008), 1132.
19 The World Bank used lending rates from 2007 to avoid the bias-
ing effects of the global financial crisis on data comparability over








Source: Doing Business Database (2010).
COST AND TIME TO RESOLVE BANKRUPTCY
Closing a Business 2010
Time in years
Notes: Countries with "no practice" and other outliers excluded.
Cost in % of estate's value
Figure 2
20 Some countries may have only one insolvency procedure that
directs the company either to liquidation or reorganization,where-
as others (like the US) have separate procedures as liquidation
(Chapter 7) and reorganization (Chapter 11).CESifo DICE Report 1/2010 49
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Business exit regulation across countries
In contrast to the entry index,the country ranking of
the World Bank’s Closing a Business index is derived
only from the sub-component recovery rate.Table 2
shows the rankings for the most recent Closing a
Business release (Doing Business, 2010).
Similar to Starting a Business mainly rich countries
are ranked in the top 10 group of countries with
most efficient bankruptcy proceedings. Particularly,
European countries like Norway, Finland, Denmark,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are listed
among the top performers. Japan and Singapore
exhibit the most efficient bankruptcy regulations
according to this indicator. The bottom 10 group
comprises mostly poor and lower-middle income
countries, similarly to the bottom 10 group in the
entry indicator’s case.
The country ranking for business exit regulations
once again reveals the looming gap between rich and
poor countries. But since Closing a Business cap-
tures only country ranks by recovery rate, a detailed
examination of the index’s sub-components is advis-
able to derive a more comprehensive picture of
bankruptcy efficiency. Figure 3a shows an obvious
negative relationship between a country’s income
endowment and the time of resolving bankruptcy.
While high-income countries exhibit the shortest
resolving time of around two years on average,
upper-middle- and lower-middle-income countries
require about one year longer. Low-income coun-
tries have the longest resolving time with about four
years on average suggesting the least efficient bank-
ruptcy proceedings among world economies with
respect to time.
More efficient bankruptcy proceedings are typically
associated with lower costs.This is supported by the
fact that countries with better income endowment
exhibit lower bankruptcy costs (Figure 3a). For the
cost sub-component the association between bank-
ruptcy efficiency and higher income is even more
pronounced than is true for the time factor. The
average costs of closing a business constitute less
than 10 percent of a business estate’s value in high-
income countries. Upper-middle- and lower-middle-
income countries exhibit bankruptcy costs ranging
from 16 to 18 percent of a business estate’s value.
Poor countries’ bankruptcy costs are highest with an
average share of almost 20 percent of a business
estate’s value.
Plotting the recovery rate by income endowment
clearly displays more efficient bankruptcy regula-
tions in richer countries (Figure 3b), as already indi-
cated by the Closing a Business index rankings in
Table 2. High-income countries manage to recover
about 61 cents on the dollar on average and are thus
way ahead of other countries’ recovery rate.
Compared to rich countries, upper-middle-income
countries only manage to recover 32 cents on the
dollar, while lower-middle-income countries are
quite close with almost 27 cents. Far behind are low-
income countries recovering only 19 cents on the
dollar on average and, hence, pose a substantial
threat to stakeholders’ investments.
The exit indicators once more suggest that a coun-
try’s wealth significantly coincides with regulation
efficiency in general and with efficiency of bankrupt-
cy proceedings in particular. Similar to Starting a
Business the outcome indicators for the exit case
(time, cost, and recovery rate) are highly correlated
with each other, especially in high-income countries.
Table 2 
Closing a Business (ranking 2010)
















Congo, Dem. Rep. 152
Philippines 153





a) Others consists of countries with the same rank-
ing as Rwanda; those countries are (157–83): Mada-
gascar, Afghanistan, Dominica, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Albania, Grenada, Trinidad and To-
bago, Bhutan, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, Lao
PDR, Sudan, Kiribati, Burundi, Cape Verde, São 
Tomé and Principe, Timor-Leste, Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Cambodia, Iraq, West Bank 
and Gaza, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Chad,
Guinea-Bissau.
Source: Doing Business Database (2010). The data
cover the period June 2009 until May 2010.Limits of the standard approach in measuring busi-
ness exit regulations
The World Bank methodology of measuring exit
indicators is based on Djankov et al.(2008).As men-
tioned by the authors,their approach is subject to the
caveat that the survey-based bankruptcy data only
apply to a specific legal business form (limited liabil-
ity) that operates in a specific sector (hotel business)
and not to large firms with complex capital struc-
tures (Djankov et al. 2008, 1147). However, such
large firms are very rare in developing countries and
as Doing Business seeks to standardize insolvency
cases for the majority of small- and medium-sized
businesses around the world, it abstains from adjust-
ing for large firms with more diversified capital
structures. Moreover, large firms may possibly have
special bankruptcy cases that do
not apply to small- and medium-
sized companies and thus would
require separate treatment.
Nevertheless, with regard to the
current financial crises, large
companies with sophisticated fi-
nancial structures,especially those
in the banking sector, deserve
more attention in the future. As
the financial sector plays an im-
portant role in the intermediation
process between creditors and en-
trepreneurs, bankruptcies in this
sector engender severe repercus-
sions for a country’s economy.
Therefore the existing exit indi-
cators should be modified to
additionally account for potential
inefficiencies in the bankruptcy
regulations of financial institu-
tions. Since bankruptcy proceed-
ings for businesses and financial
intermediations differ substan-
tially (Djankov 2009), a separate
investigation of bankruptcy mea-
sures for the financial sector in
addition to the existing business
cases seems to be indicated.These
differences stem from the fact that
creditors or management initiate
bankruptcy proceedings in the
case of businesses, while govern-
mental authorities are the initia-
tors in the case of financial inter-
mediations. Furthermore, applying the efficiency cri-
teria of business bankruptcy to the financial sector
may not be appropriate as, for example, the time-
efficient bankruptcy trails of limited-liability compa-
nies in high-income countries (about two years) may
take too long to resolve a banking bankruptcy.
Disruptions in credit markets will create enormous
negative feedback effects on the entire economy the
longer the proceedings last.
In addition the current economic and financial situa-
tion of some distressed countries demands that we
consider ways of how to measure the efficiency of
country bankruptcy procedures. In the course of the
current financial crisis governments have had to step
into the breach and inject enormous economic stim-
ulus packages for the economy, which have pushed
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them to the edge of bankruptcy. Greece, Island and
Argentina have already accumulated a tremendous
debt that will be difficult if not even impossible to
pay off. How to assess efficient bankruptcy proce-
dures in these cases and to what extent these cir-
cumstances will eventually affect a country’s busi-
ness environment will have a profound impact on
future generations of Doing Business indicators.
Another caveat to the World Bank’s methodology of
deriving exit indicators is that there are other poten-
tial factors that may determine whether a company
gets rehabilitated or liquidated in addition to the
well-established regulations for securing creditors’
loans and property rights. The exit outcome indica-
tors capture primarily the enforceability of debt con-
tracts and the efficiency of proceedings, both of
which are definitely important incentives for credi-
tors to provide loans and create a beneficial business
environment.However,other factors such as interest
rates, the existence of appropriate financial interme-
diations and favourable market opportunities to
keep a business as a going concern, may be vital fac-
tors affecting a company’s prospects as well.
General limitations of the Doing Business method-
ology for the entry and exit indicator
This section evaluates the World Bank’s methodolo-
gy for both Starting a Business and Closing a
Business indicators by presenting general limitations
to the standard case study approach,as provided pri-
marily by the review of the World Bank Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG 2008).
Both case studies assume the company is located in
the economy’s most populous city (IEG 2008, 43).
This implies a business environment specific to large,
economically strong centers only and is not repre-
sentative for other, more remote parts of the coun-
try.21 Although the World Bank tries to address this
issue by conducting research on sub-national indica-
tors for selected countries, which was initiated in
2008, they do not cover a wide range of countries as
they do for the established Doing Business indica-
tors. Introducing more representative indicators for
differentiated,economically relevant regions has be-
come even more important, as the published sub-
national studies have pointed out significant differ-
ences in the impact of regulatory reforms on the
business environment of cities and regions within the
same country (Doing Business 2010, 77).
Regarding the legal business form assumed in the
case studies, the World Bank also concentrates sole-
ly on domestically owned limited-liability companies
(IEG 2008, 7). As mentioned above for the specific
indicators, this is done to standardize the results for
the majority of business forms around the world.But
this approximation comes at the cost of not being
representative for country-specific regulations of
other legal business forms, especially in industrial-
ized countries.In Germany,for example,sole propri-
etorship in terms of private partnership (GBR) is a
widespread business form that is subject to different
regulations than a limited-liability company. This is
also true for limited partnerships (KGs) or limited
partnerships with limited-liability companies (GmbH
& Co. KG), which are also prevalent German busi-
ness forms. With regard to ownership structure, the
domestically-owned nature of the business does not
allow for any foreign corporate integrations nor for
entirely foreign-owned companies. Regulations for
these types of legal businesses may also differ sub-
stantially from those for entirely domestically-
owned companies across countries,thereby reducing
the representativeness of the businesses affected by
regulations.
Another question concerning the business coverage
of both indicators is to what extent the case studies
really capture relevant business forms in poor and
low-income countries. This is due to the World
Bank’s specification of hypothetical businesses being
small and medium-sized and varying in size from 50
(for Starting a Business) to 201 employees (for
Closing a Business). The regulations measured for
these specific businesses are very unlikely to apply to
wide-spread forms of micro-enterprises in develop-
ing countries (IEG 2008, 10). Moreover, the majori-
ty of micro-enterprises may not be operating in the
formal sector and, hence, studies designed to mea-
sure formal sector regulations will inevitably fail to
provide reliable information on the effects of reform
on the business environment within countries that
are characterized by large informal economies (IEG
2008, 10).
More fundamentally, a general limitation to the
application of cross-country regulation indicators is
that employing a standardized case study approach is
unable to capture the precise regulation context that
21 For example, high-tech clusters such as Silicon Valley in the US
or Bangalore in India, which are thriving centers located outside
the most populous cities, are not accounted for.determines a country’s specific business environ-
ment. This is due to the fact that the indicators are
constructed from uniform criteria to ensure a stan-
dardized compilation of comparable cross-country
data.To assess the impact of each indicator for a spe-
cific country comprehensively, researchers actually
need to know and understand the country-specific
regulations and idiosyncrasies as well.Applying only
the standardized country outcomes without knowing
the country-specific regulations will be misleading in
assessing a country’s business environment as well as
in reform recommendations.This may be even more
of a problem as the institutional settings of rich and
poor countries often differ substantially from the
start. Therefore, it would be useful to classify coun-
tries first according to their institutional level into,
e.g., industrialized, emerging, and least-developed
countries, and then apply class-specific modified case
studies to these regions.In doing so,one could expect
to get more reliable data on the specific regions by
capturing more of their intuitional idiosyncrasies,
instead of having one general case study applied to
183 countries, leveling all relevant country-specific
institutions for the sake of generality.
Another fundamental limitation of the World Bank
regulation indicators is their inability to distinguish
clearly between correlation and causality, more pre-
cisely,to determine the effects of regulatory processes,
laws and rules on observable economic outcomes.
Changes of specific regulations need to be connected
theoretically to changes in related economic outcomes
before preliminary causal effects can be deduced.
Empirically, both entry and exit indicators do not
clearly determine a one-way direction of better regu-
lations generating better economic outcomes, as is
generally suggested by the reports.It could also be the
other way round, for example, for a positively corre-
lated association between a country’s income endow-
ment and its regulation efficiency.There is no definite
empirically proven causality direction, whether more
efficient regulations induce countries to prosper or
whether inhabitants of advanced country simply
demand more efficient regulations (IEG 2008, 5).
Another methodological drawback has to do with the
confidence of the statistical inference and the reliabil-
ity of the indicators and thus with the number of sur-
vey respondents within each country (IEG 2008, 13).
According to the data notes of the Doing Business
2010 report more than 8,000 local experts administer
the survey (Doing Business 2010, 77).The report lists
1,403 and 863 contributors for the indicators Starting
a Business and Closing a Business, respectively.
Breaking down these numbers for Germany, for
example, results in 13 and 4 contributors, respective-
ly.22 Considering the extent of various German regu-
lations based on business form,an increase in the cur-
rent numbers of local experts would certainly help to
reduce data insecurity. This argument becomes espe-
cially important due to the fact that the outcome indi-
cators are based on the subjective judgement of
experts,whereas for diverging survey responses medi-
an judgements are employed as surrogates. Hence,
large numbers of local experts – as far as practically
feasible – would definitely help to make estimates
more precise in case of diverging responses.23 Also,
closely tied to the problem of subjective judgements
is the difficulty of getting experts from different cul-
tural and educational backgrounds to assess the legal
facts (as designed in the case studies) in a similar
manner. Inherent differences stemming from cultural
predispositions may entail local experts of different
countries to judge the same issue differently.
Finally,as pointed out in the discussion on bankrupt-
cy,the general business transactions assumed in both
case studies only reflect a specific standardized set of
issues a company is potentially faced with and,
hence, does not reflect other essential issues influ-
encing the overall investment climate (IEG 2008, 3).
The two indicators presented here as well as the
other Doing Business indicators (not covered in this
study) concentrate exclusively on the costs and bur-
dens of regulations. But since doing business
depends not only on regulation, but also on political
(e.g., civil wars) and macroeconomic stability (e.g.,
inflation, sustainable budget deficits), infrastructure
(fostering competition and private participation),
and availability of qualified workers (IEG 2008, 4),
the set of indicators should reflecte the investment
climate in a more comprehensive manner.
Conclusion
Gathering and compiling international data on regu-
lations enable the construction of indexes and indi-
cators that help to study the relationship between
economic rules, laws and processes and economical-
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22 Information on contributors by indicator and country can be
obtained under http://www.doingbusiness.org/LocalPartners/
[accessed January 11, 2010].
23 The number of respondents in poor and developing countries is
of particular concern,e.g., Zambia (7 for entry case,3 for exit case)
or Vietnam (5 for entry case, 5 for exit case), where the number of
local experts is too small to provide reliable outcome indicators.CESifo DICE Report 1/2010 53
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ly related outcomes.These may include poverty, cor-
ruption, employment as well as market competition,
entry and exit of new firms, and productivity. Setting
up these indicators in an international context helps
to develop and refine standardized methods for
comparing different country regulations over time,
and thus broadens our understanding of internation-
al regulations in principle.
The World Bank’s Doing Business reports have
become an invaluable tool for identifying the reform
needs of a country’s business environment. They
provide the guidance to analyze underlying institu-
tional patterns by capturing symptoms of defects via
simple and understandable numerical outcome indi-
cators.They also enable investigations across differ-
ent sets of regulation indicators to assess regulatory
reforms with respect to questions of, for example,
how entry and exit proceedings that interact with
labor and financial market regulations are able to
enhance a country’s business environment. Never-
theless, the indicators themselves are not the
answers, although they may lead to answers. When
properly interpreted and in due consideration of
other vital micro- and macroeconomic factors, they
provide the catalyst for identifying reform areas,
where the costs and burdens of doing business can
be reduced so that countries can grow and prosper.
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